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Abstract—Biometric authentication is vulnerable to 
presentation (spoofing) attacks. It is important to address the 
security vulnerability of spoofing attacks where an attacker uses 
an artefact presented at the sensor to subvert the system. Gaze-
tracking has been proposed for such attack detection. In this 
paper, we explore the sensitivity of a gaze-based approach to 
spoofing detection in the presence of eye-glasses that may impact 
detection performance. In particular, we investigate the use of 
partially tinted glasses such as may be used in hazardous 
environments or outdoors in mobile application scenarios The 
attack scenarios considered in this work include the use of 
projected photos, 2D and 3D masks. A gaze-based spoofing 
detection system has been extensively evaluated using data 
captured from volunteers performing genuine attempts (with 
and without wearing such tinted glasses) as well as spoofing 
attempts using various artefacts. The results of the evaluations 
indicate that the presence of tinted glasses has a small impact on 
the accuracy of attack detection, thereby making the use of such 
gaze-based features possible for a wider range of applications. 
Keywords— biometrics, spoofing, liveness; mobile security, 
gaze tracking, challenge-response technique. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Biometric systems have the potential to provide solutions 
for a variety of real time security applications. However, 
presentation attacks at the sensor is still a serious challenge to 
their use especially in un-supervised applications. This, 
however, can be addressed through a “Liveness” detection 
mechanism, which can be added to the existing biometric 
systems. Tracking users’ gaze while responding to a visual 
stimulus has already been reported as a potential solution to 
this problem and a number of novel features that rely on such 
approach has been proposed [9-11,15-17]. In all these cases, 
data were acquired under ideal conditions where the users’ 
eyes are clearly visible to facilitate gaze tracking easily. 
However, there are special cases where a user may be wearing 
tinted glasses especially in outdoor scenarios or may have to 
wear protective tinted glasses in hazardous work 
environments making gaze tracking for attack detection a 
more challenging task. In this paper, we explore the sensitivity 
of a gaze-based approach to spoofing detection in the presence 
of partially tinted eye-glasses and assess any impact on its 
attack detection accuracy. The system has been extensively 
evaluated using data captured from volunteers performing 
genuine attempts (with and without wearing such tinted 
glasses) as well as spoofing attempts using various artefacts. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the 
state of the art of presentation attack detection (PAD) systems 
for facial biometrics. Section III presents the experimental 
setup and corresponding results are shown in Section IV. 
Conclusions are then provided in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In the literature various approaches have been presented to 
establish liveness to detect presentation attacks. These 
approaches can be grouped into active and passive categories. 
Active approaches need user engagement with the biometric 
system to establish the liveness of the source through the 
sample captured at the sensor. Passive approaches do not 
require user co-operation or even user awareness but exploit 
involuntary physical movements. These can be spontaneous 
eye blinks and 3D properties of the image source. 
A. Passive Techniques 
Blinking is a natural phenomenon of the closing and 
opening of the eyelid. The blink helps spread fluid from the 
tear ducts across the eye and removes irritants from the surface 
of the cornea and conjunctiva [1]. Blinking has been used as a 
means of human interaction with computer [4, 5]. Eye blink 
has also been used for face liveness detection in the literature 
for biometric systems. Eye blink can be detected by 
classifying each image in a video sequence independently as 
one state (closed eye or open eye). A blink can then be defined 
by a procedure of eyes going from open to closed, and back to 
open. The blink speed can be affected by fatigue, 
injury/disease, medication, etc. Lin Sun et al. [2] presented an 
eye blink detection approach for detecting face liveness using 
Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) which has been further 
enhanced in [3]. In this method, they extracted the temporal 
information from the process of the eye-blink, namely the 
consecutive stages of open, half closed and closed, followed 
by half open and fully open all of which are sequential eye 
blink movements and constitute a complete eye blink pattern 
which was used to determine liveness.  
When a photograph is printed on a paper, it introduces 
texture which is not present in the original images when 
captured from genuine user's faces. Schwartz et al. [4] 
proposed a texture based counter spoofing method for photo 
attack detection. They explored face texture, colour and shape 
to obtain a holistic representation. They generated feature 
vectors formed by combining low-level feature descriptors for 
each frame of a video that contains the facial information. 
Pinto et al. [5] presented a technique for video replay attack 
detection by analysing the noise signatures which were 
generated during video acquisition process. These noise 
properties, extracted from the captured video, were analysed 
using Fourier transform for spoofing attack detection. A 
compact representation, called visual rhythm, was proposed to 
detect the temporal information in the Fourier spectrum. 
Maatta et al. [6] proposed an approach based on reflection. 
According to the authors, genuine and fake facial images have 
differences in reflection. They used LBP-based micro texture 
analysis. Normalised facial images were divided into several 
local regions and three descriptors were extracted from each 
block. The LBP operator was applied on the normalized face 
image.  
Except 3D mask, all the commonly used artefacts are 2D 
in nature. The real face is 3D which carries depth information. 
Lagorio et al. [7] proposed a novel liveness detection method 
based on 3D facial structure. The proposed approach could be 
deployed in 2D or 3D face recognition system to detect 
spoofing attacks. The proposed algorithm computed the 3D 
features of the captured face data. 
B. Active Techniques 
Systems based on the challenge-response approach belong 
to the active category. In this category, the user is asked to 
perform specific activities to ascertain liveness such as 
uttering digits or changing his or her head pose. This approach 
may be useful against photo and video spoofing attacks. 
However, it could be challenging to stop mask attack using 
this method. Frischholz et al. [8] explored a challenge-
response approach where users were required to look in 
certain directions randomly. The system estimated the head 
pose and compared it to the instructions given by the system. 
Ali et al. [9-11, 15] reported explicit gaze-based liveness 
detection approach for the first time. A moving object was 
shown randomly on the screen for user to follow with eye and 
head movement. The visual stimulus directed the gaze of the 
user to specific points on the screen. Features extracted from 
images where users were looking at collinear, colocated 
locations on the screen and corresponding gaze homography 
were used to estimate the liveness of the source. Experiments 
showed that the methods were effective in counter spoofing 
for all three types of attack (photo, 2D mask and video replay). 
Singh et al. [12] proposed a liveness detection scheme based 
on eye and mouth movements. The challenges were generated 
randomly such as eye or mouth movement (openness/ 
closeness). Responses were estimated using the corresponding 
eye and mouth movements. Smith et al. [13] proposed an 
approach to counter replay attacks on smart devices using a 
challenge-response technique. The bright white colour is 
considered as a challenge, and the reflection from the person’s 
face due to this white colour is the response. They also used 
different colours as challenge and the corresponding 
reflections from the face due to these various colours were 
analysed to determine the presentation attack. Cai et al. [14] 
proposed system based on gaze estimation. The challenge 
creates points on the computer screen and the user is required 
to look at these points. Gaze estimation model was trained for 
each subject to predict the gaze positions when the user 
looking at computer screen. The difference between the 
predicted and the screen points are then used to differentiate 
between attacks and genuine attempts. 
In the very early phase of face-PAD research [19, 20], 
spoof attack detection approaches were evaluated on 
proprietary datasets [21]. The use of private databases can be 
seen as somewhat reasonable when (random) challenge-
response based methods demands specific user interaction 
[21]. Several publicly available datasets [21–28] are now 
available to test, evaluate, and compare face-PAD methods. 
However, the attack scenarios addressed in these databases are 
mostly photo and video attacks. This paper explores the 
impact of tinted glasses on gaze based spoof detection for 
which a database has been collected locally to simulate such 
attack as none of the public databases included tinted glasses. 
III. THE GAZE-BASED PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION 
SYSTEM 
Fig. 1 shows the block diagram of the proposed system 
where a visual stimulus (as part of the challenge) appears on 
the display which the participant is asked to follow and the 
camera (sensor) captures facial images at each position of the 
stimulus on the screen. A control mechanism is used to ensure 
the placement of the target and the image acquisition are 
synchronized. The system extracts facial landmarks in the 
captured frames, computes various features from these 
landmarks, which are then used to classify whether the 
presentation attempt is by a genuine user. 
A. Visual Stimulus and User Response Acquisition 
The restricted geometry of a mobile device display (Tablet 
device, 15.87×21.18 cm) is simulated in the experiments using 
 
Fig. 1. The PAD system block diagram 
 
Fig.2. Sample of Points Challenge grid. 
 
a limited area of a desktop computer screen. A small shape 
(“x”) is presented, at distinct locations on the screen as shown 
in Fig. 2. The cross sign appears in a grid of 30 distinct pre-
defined locations (Points Challenge) (Fig. 2). The order of 
points is randomised for each challenge attempt. During each 
presentation, images were acquired at every location of the 
challenge. The presentation of the challenge sequence lasted 
approximately 1 minute, however, only a small portion of 
each session was used for spoofing detection. 
Data was collected from 80 participants. This number of 
participants is sufficient to illustrate the potential of the 
proposed approach and is in line with current state-of-the-art. 
Participants were of both male and female gender aged over 
18 years old. The volunteers were from Africa, Asia, Middle-
East, and Europe. Three spoofing attack types (projected 
photo, 2D mask and 3D mask), one genuine attempt without 
wearing tinted glasses and one genuine attempt wearing tinted 
glasses were recorded for each participant. Fig. 3(a) shows 
genuine attempt, Fig. 3(b) shows projected photo attempt, 
Figs. 3(c) and 3(d) show 2D mask and 3D mask attacks 
respectively. A participant wearing tinted glasses is shown in 
Fig. 4. 
B. Facial Landmark Detection and Feature Extraction 
The images thus captured during the challenge-response 
operation were processed using Chehra Version 3.0 [18] in 
order to extract facial landmark points. Chehra returns 59 
different landmarks on the face region. The coordinates of 
some of these landmarks were used for feature extraction in 
the proposed scheme. Features proposed here are based on the 
eye movement during the challenge. 
C. Gaze based colocation feature 
For the colocation feature, the Points stimulus is used 
letting the user to fixate on a number of randomly selected 
locations on the screen. At each stimulus location, the facial 
image of the user is captured. The gaze colocation features are 
extracted from images where the stimulus is at the same 
locations at different times. It can be assumed that the 
coordinates of the pupil centres in these corresponding frames 
should also be very similar. This should result in a very small 
variance in the observed coordinates of the pupil centres in 
genuine attempts. On the contrary, for presentation attacks, the 
gaze fixations are expected to be more variable resulting in 
much higher variances. A feature vector is thus formed from 
the variances of pupil centre coordinates for all the frames 
where the stimulus is colocated. The features are then passed 
to the classifier to discriminate between genuine and fake 
attempts.  
Suppose 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖  are the observed coordinates of a given 
landmark in response to the stimulus presented at the same 
location at different instances. To quantify the deviation from 
perfect colocation, the variances in the observed landmarks 
are calculated. Let 𝜎𝑢
2  and 𝜎𝑣
2  denote the variances of the 
observed landmarks. 
 
where ?̅?  and ?̅?   is the mean of the observed landmark 
locations and  𝑁  is cardinality of the corresponding subset of 
responses. These variances are concatenated together for 
feature vector as shown below: 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
Several sets of experiments were carried out to verify the 
performance of the proposed features in distinguishing 
genuine attempts from attacks. Initially, the effectiveness of 
the proposed colocation features was investigated with 
genuine presentation without wearing glasses. Subsequently 
experiments were carried out to investigate whether this 
feature would work effectively even if tinted glasses are worn 
by the genuine users.  
Table I shows the performances for three attack scenarios 
(photo, 2D mask and 3D mask). Each set of colocated points 
takes around 3 seconds to present. It is clear from the table that 
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Fig. 3. Data collection process (a) genuine attempt without glass, (b) 





Fig. 4. A participant wearing tinted glasses 
TABLE I.  TPR AT FPR = 0.10 FOR VARIOUS SETS OF 
COLOCATION POINTS, TRAINED AND TEST WITH GENUINE 
PRESENTATION WITHOUT WEARING  GLASSES 
Attack Type 
Sets of colocated points 
3 10 15 
Photo 92% 92% 93% 
2D Mask 44% 42% 43% 
3D Mask 40% 48% 57% 
 
genuine presentations. It is apparent that the performance of 
the system generally improves with the number of colocated 
sets of points used as features. At 10% FPR, the TPR is 93% 
for photo attack using 15 sets of colocation points. This is 
changed only slightly when even as few as three sets of 
colocation points are used. The detection accuracy of the 
system was found to be much lower for 2D mask and 3D mask 
attacks. At 10% FPR, the performance is 43% and 57% TPRs 
for 2D mask and 3D mask using 15 sets of colocation points. 
When fewer sets of colocation points are used the performance 
under 3D mask attacks is dropped more than that for 2D mask 
attacks which remains more or less stable. The performance 
of the system for 3D mask attack detection is slightly better 
than that achieved for 2D mask attacks detection. At 10% 
FPR, 3D mask detection TPR is about 48% for 10 set of 
colocation points. 
Fig. 5 presents the ROC curves for attack detection. The 
performance of the system for 3D mask attack detection is 
slightly better than that achieved for 2D mask attack detection. 
These results may be explained due to the ease with which an 
attacker may be able to look through the holes cut in the 2D 
and 3D masks. Given the flexibility of the 2D masks used 
compared to the rigid 3D masks, it may be easier for the 
attacker to subvert the system using the 2D mask, hence the 
slightly worse detection results for this attack type. 
A similar set of tests was conducted with the system being 
trained with genuine presentations without wearing tinted 
glasses, but tested with users wearing tinted glasses. The 
purpose of this set of experiments was to investigate the 
performance of the system when genuine users attempted to 
access the system with tinted glasses. 
Table II summarizes the TPRs at FPR = 10% for various 
sets of colocation points for these experiments. The 
performance of the system remains largely unchanged as the 
number of collocated point sets is reduced. In case of photo 
attack detection, at 10% FPR, the TPR is 90% using 15 sets of 
colocation points. The performance of the system was found 
to be worse when the colocation feature is used for 2D mask 
attack detection. At 10% FPR, the performance is about 43% 
TPR for 15 sets of colocation points. The performance of the 
system for 3D mask attack detection is slightly better than that 
achieved for 2D mask attacks detection. Fig. 6 shows the 
corresponding ROC curves for the three attack scenarios for 
10 sets of colocation points.  
Tables I and II provide comparison of TPRs for a range of 
FPRs for three attack scenarios with and without wearing 
tinted glasses. It is clearly seen that while wearing tinted 
glasses has generally lead to a reduction in accuracy, the 
overall performance level for photo attack detection is still 
significant. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper explored the impact of wearing tinted glasses 
on the detection accuracy of a gaze-based presentation attack 
detection technique. It is seen that wearing such glasses does 
have an impact on performance of such spoofing attack 
detection techniques. However, the impact is not very large 
for attack types that are amenable to this form of detection and 
the performance may still be acceptable in some application. 
This result may be of particular significance in applications 
when spoofing detection may need to take place in outdoor 
environments using mobile devices or in indoor hazardous 
environments that may demand the use of eyewear for 
protection. Future work will explore the impact of tinted 
glasses when using other challenge-response spoofing 
detection techniques as well as the possibility for the use of 
reflective glasses in gaze-based liveness detection. 
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